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7 decision.196 Simultaneously Jody Powell. announced in Washington that Carter had
ordered production of components to begin197 , and on January 6, 1979, at a four-power
summit meeting, Carter, Callaghan, Helmut Schmidt and Valery Giscard d Estaing agreed
that  some kind of modernization of the neutron bomb project would now be
187
Manchester Guardian, April 9, 1978, page #10 and April 16, 1978, page #10.
188
Financial Times, April 17, 1978, page #17.
189
Edmonton Journal, April 25, 1978, page #4.
190
Toronto Star, June 3, 1978, page #III-2.
191
New York Times, April 28, 1978, page #12.
192
Toronto Star, May 27, 1978, page #1.
193
Atlas, May 1, 1978, pages #31-34 and June 1, 1978, page #13.
194
New York Times, June 12, 1978, page #14.
195
New York Times, April 20, 1978, page #10.
196
New York Times, October 19, 1978, page #45.
197
New York Times, October 19, 1978, page #5.
- 70 -
necessary.198
And there, for the time being, the neutron bomb s discussion in a principally-NATO
context came to a halt.
Even with the advantage of hindsight it is difficult to judge the interaction because of
the extensive security and carefully-phrased statements that surrounded the negotiations,
but it can be said that the mechanisms of NATO itself do not deserve to be faulted on
grounds of inefficiency. The consultation and planning groups served their designed
purpose; the failure to achieve consensus was rather a political problem of the individual
nations involved. It appears that each nation simply wanted the others to go first; on a
more comprehensive scale there seemed to be a tacit polarization on this move between
the United States and all of the West European NATO members.
Jimmy Carter could find no single solution acceptable to NATO. If he decided to
proceed with the bomb unilaterally, he could have made himself the sole target of anti-
neutron bomb sentiment in both the United States and abroad - even if European
governments might secretly be relieved that NATO would have the new weapon. If Carter
chose to await foreign ratification of the bomb, he would be accused - as he was - of
abandoning America s position of leadership in NATO. His ultimate attempt at
compromise probably drew the most favorable reaction that any solution under these
circumstances could have achieved.
At the same time the entire episode reflected little credit to the West European
members of NATO, who for years had been expressing dissatisfaction with their lack of
influence over the American nuclear umbrella and who, now that they finally had a
chance to participate in a key nuclear decision, got cold feet.
Why the cold feet? The most apparent explanation is simply that they were more
sensitive to anti-nuclear and anti-neutron sentiment on the part of their respective
populations than they were worried about the actual threat of a Warsaw Pact invasion of
the west.
Dr. Hans von Plötz of the German Embassy in Washington stresses that the West
Europeans image of the Soviet Union and its allies is in many ways less intimidating than
the image that many Americans have. They have learned to live with them as neighbors -
somewhat bothersome but nonetheless human neighbors, whereas Americans tend to
stereotype Russians in a somewhat fear-inspiring image - a holdover, perhaps, from the
 Red scare days of the 1940s and 1950s. Plötz point is not that the Warsaw Pact
presents no threat, but rather that it is not a threat which hangs constantly over West
Europe. One might call this a kind of  reverse Finlandization in the sense that the very
fact of surviving so long in the face of the Soviet threat has tended to make many West
Europeans complacent about that threat, foreboding military statistics notwithstanding.
In the absence of a  real perceived threat, then, it is not altogether surprising that
the European governments of NATO would be tempted to place their own stability and
preservation as intranational political groups above measures to deter a  false threat. It
isn t the sort of attitude which any one of the countries in question would be anxious to
announce; it would of course be offensive to Washington and possibly to the brunt-bearing
European NATO members as well. But it would explain the European behavior in this
instance.
Had  Finlandization fears played a noticeable part, they would have been evident as
comparatively extreme and emotional pro-deployment sentiment by various countries or [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]