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things; for we have an image of these. Again, of the most accurate
arguments, some lead to Ideas of relations, of which they say there
is no independent class, and others introduce the 'third man'.
"And in general the arguments for the Forms destroy things for whose
existence the believers in Forms are more zealous than for the existence
of the Ideas; for it follows that not the dyad but number is first,
and that prior to number is the relative, and that this is prior to
the absolute-besides all the other points on which certain people,
by following out the opinions held about the Forms, came into conflict
with the principles of the theory.
"Again, according to the assumption on the belief in the Ideas rests,
there will be Forms not only of substances but also of many other
things; for the concept is single not only in the case of substances,
but also in that of non-substances, and there are sciences of other
things than substance; and a thousand other such difficulties confront
them. But according to the necessities of the case and the opinions
about the Forms, if they can be shared in there must be Ideas of substances
only. For they are not shared in incidentally, but each Form must
be shared in as something not predicated of a subject. (By 'being
shared in incidentally' I mean that if a thing shares in 'double itself',
it shares also in 'eternal', but incidentally; for 'the double' happens
to be eternal.) Therefore the Forms will be substance. But the same
names indicate substance in this and in the ideal world (or what will
be the meaning of saying that there is something apart from the particulars-
the
one over many?). And if the Ideas and the things that share in them
have the same form, there will be something common: for why should
'2' be one and the same in the perishable 2's, or in the 2's which
are many but eternal, and not the same in the '2 itself' as in the
individual 2? But if they have not the same form, they will have only
the name in common, and it is as if one were to call both Callias
and a piece of wood a 'man', without observing any community between
them.
"But if we are to suppose that in other respects the common definitions
apply to the Forms, e.g. that 'plane figure' and the other parts of
the definition apply to the circle itself, but 'what really is' has
to be added, we must inquire whether this is not absolutely meaningless.
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METAPHYSICS 160
For to what is this to be added? To 'centre' or to 'plane' or to all
the parts of the definition? For all the elements in the essence are
Ideas, e.g. 'animal' and 'two-footed'. Further, there must be some
Ideal answering to 'plane' above, some nature which will be present
in all the Forms as their genus.
Part 5 "
"Above all one might discuss the question what in the world the Forms
contribute to sensible things, either to those that are eternal or
to those that come into being and cease to be; for they cause neither
movement nor any change in them. But again they help in no wise either
towards the knowledge of other things (for they are not even the substance
of these, else they would have been in them), or towards their being,
if they are not in the individuals which share in them; though if
they were, they might be thought to be causes, as white causes whiteness
in a white object by entering into its composition. But this argument,
which was used first by Anaxagoras, and later by Eudoxus in his discussion
of difficulties and by certain others, is very easily upset; for it
is easy to collect many and insuperable objections to such a view.
"But, further, all other things cannot come from the Forms in any
of the usual senses of 'from'. And to say that they are patterns and
the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical
metaphors. For what is it that works, looking to the Ideas? And any
thing can both be and come into being without being copied from something
else, so that, whether Socrates exists or not, a man like Socrates
might come to be. And evidently this might be so even if Socrates
were eternal. And there will be several patterns of the same thing,
and therefore several Forms; e.g. 'animal' and 'two-footed', and also
'man-himself', will be Forms of man. Again, the Forms are patterns
not only of sensible things, but of Forms themselves also; i.e. the
genus is the pattern of the various forms-of-a-genus; therefore the
same thing will be pattern and copy.
"Again, it would seem impossible that substance and that whose substance [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]